Pros
- Flat office layout, management and other staff are pretty accessible - Well-stocked kitchen and lounge area, can always eat breakfast at the office before work - Friday beer o'clock is a good way to socialize with colleagues and get to know the office - Exposure to buy side transactions, which can be useful for future exit opportunities, especially in the infrastructure space. Many former MD's and VP's of Macquarie in the U.S., Australia and Asia have established their own funds, which seem to have more of a PE-shop style culture and structure. - Regional conferences in cool locations (Spain, Greece, Australia etc.) but these are a thing of the past due to cost cuts and the overall realization that they were just large debauchery conventions where nothing of any business substance was ever accomplished.
Cons
- Macquarie is struggling to re-position its business model in the United States. Pre-2007, they excelled in the purchase and fund management of infrastructure and related assets/businesses. Pay was attractive due to lucrative fees earned in the process. However, that business model essentially broke down due to poor performing investments and the inability to raise additional equity capital to support the existing headcount and model in place. Babcock & Brown, which was a smaller version of Macquarie went bust in 2008. Macquarie was able to survive since it is a bank and had other lines of business to cushion it in the downturn. Since 2007, Macquarie pivoted by focusing more on 3rd-party M&A advisory, first by purchasing Giuliani Capital Advisors, which was a complete waste (most left or were let go within the first year post-acquisition) - Australians vs. the non-Australians (mostly Americans). Noticeable bias towards expat Australians when it comes to management decision making and layoffs. This culture has degraded morale and stands in the way of the US franchise ever being able to make headway in the U.S. market. The Australians do not seem to understand the importance of hiring and retaining good local American talent. The result is that they have to overpay for mediocre talent from other BB banks that ends up leaving after a couple of years once they understand the culture. - The belief that they can excel as PE investors in the U.S. Many of their key investments/buyouts such as Indiana Toll Road, Spirit Finance, Express Energy, Advantage Rental Car, Smart Cart, AirServ etc. have performed poorly and in some cases gone bankrupt pretty quickly. Express Energy was purchased at the height of the energy boom in 2008. A couple of investments have performed well but the BAD ones outweigh the GOOD ones, which is the main reason why they can no longer raise much external equity (and are restricted to their balance sheet). Any attempts by them to manage companies has been a failure because as excel crunching bankers they do not have an operational bone in their body, except for a few people on their fund management side.